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Abstract. Well understood methods exist for developing programs from given
specifications. A formal method identifies proof obligations at each development
step: if all such proof obligations are discharged, a precisely defined class of
errors can be excluded from the final program. For a class of “closed” systems
such methods offer a gold standard against which less formal approaches can be
measured.
For “open” systems –those which interact with the physical world– the task of
obtaining the program specification can be as challenging as the task of deriving
the program. And, when a system of this class must tolerate certain kinds of
unreliability in the physical world, it is still more challenging to reach confidence
that the specification obtained is adequate. We argue that widening the notion of
software development to include specifying the behaviour of the relevant parts of
the physical world gives a way to derive the specification of a control system and
also to record precisely the assumptions being made about the world outside the
computer.
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1 Introduction
A number of methods exist for developing sequential programs from formal specifica-
tions (e.g. [9, 1]). Although such methods are not universally practised, their existence
provides a “gold standard” that encourages developers to believe that program design
errors can be eliminated. A development method that can scale up to deal with realistic
problems must be compositional in the sense that the specification of a sub-system is
a complete statement of its required properties. For sequential programs, various forms
of pre-/post-condition specifications are adequate. For concurrent programs, the task of
finding tractable compositional methods proved more challenging [11]; but even here,
techniques like rely and guarantee specifications (cf. [7, 8, 10, 2]) provide composi-
tional methods.
If a distinction is made between “closed” and “open” systems –where the former
are essentially algorithms in an understood computational domain– it could be said that
adequate formal methods are available for closed systems. But the class of “open” sys-
tems, which interact with the physical world via sensors and actuators, is both large and
very important. Such open systems are often deployed in safety-critical environments.
For many of these systems, the task of obtaining a program specification is itself a ma-
jor challenge. It is to the understanding of this task that the present paper is intended to
contribute.
The approach proposed is first to specify the requirements and environment of the
overall system; then to capture the assumptions on the physical components by record-
ing rely-conditions; and only then to derive a specification of the computational part
of the control system. The developer should resist the temptation to jump in and start
specifying the control system from the beginning of a project.
Most open (control) systems must also be designed to tolerate failures in the physi-
cal components, both the sensors and actuators and others. Although this need does not
change the problem of deriving a specification in any fundamental way, it poses a sig-
nificant challenge: it is difficult to achieve perspicuity in a specification that addresses
the possibility of failures. We address this concern in Section 4. Of course, we make no
claim that such systems can be made perfectly safe; we claim only to offer a method
that will make it easier to identify the assumptions about the physical components of
the system and to ensure that they are formally documented.
Our emphasis on looking first at the external physical environment of a system is
advocated in [6, 4, 5]. The original approach to rely/guarantee specifications was not
rich enough to cope with continuously varying physical quantities like temperatures,
and so we use the notation developed in [12, 13]. Earlier, partial, attacks using some of
the ideas presented here include [14].
This paper presents an attack on a particular illustrative design problem. We do not
claim that what follows is a universal method: indeed, it is not enough for some prob-
lems and too much for others. But the task of designing a control system for some part of
physical reality is a common task, and achieving a dependable system is a challenging
goal.
Essentially the idea is to insist that an initial specification be based on a wide view
of a system, including both the machine and the problem world. The machine is the
computer, executing the control program to be developed. The problem world is that
Determining specifications 3
part of physical reality in which the problem resides and in which the effects of the
system, once installed and set in operation, will be evaluated. Drawing the boundaries
of the problem world demands a judgement based on the responsibilities and the scope
of authority of the customer for the system. The customer’s responsibilities bound the
effects to be evaluated in the problem world, while the scope of authority bounds the
freedom of the developers in aiming to achieve those effects.
In general, execution of the control program can not bring about the desired ef-
fects directly. They must be brought about indirectly, relying on causal properties of the
problem world. We therefore use rely conditions on the problem world in specifying
the control system; with corresponding (or stronger) guarantee conditions one can then
prove that the parallel composition of the machine with the problem world satisfies the
specification of the whole system. The rely conditions remain in the specification as a
reminder and a warning: they must be checked for safe deployment.4
A very simple illustration is a room heating system [12]. We should not jump at once
into a specification of the control program, stating what corrective action should follow
when the temperature sensor indicates that some limit value has been exceeded. Instead
we should first specify the desired relationship between the actual room temperature and
the target temperature set on the control knob: this is the requirement. Then we should
record, in rely conditions, the properties of the environment: that is, the assumptions
we make about the accuracy of the sensors and about the causal chain from activation
of the heating equipment to changes in the actual room temperature. Only then are we
ready to develop the specification of the control program.
Our ideas are presented using the example of a controller for an irrigation sluice
gate. Section 2 begins with the overall requirement for an ideally reliable sluice gate.
Section 3 introduces the sensors and motor used to control an ideal sluice gate and de-
velops a specification for a controller for this ideal sluice gate. In Section 4 we consider
faults in the problem world, and extend the controller to cope with those faults that it
can detect.
2 The Sluice Gate problem
The example considered below concerns a sluice gate [5] which controls the flow of
water for irrigation purposes. The customer’s requirement is that the time when the gate
is fully open should be in a certain ratio to time when it is fully closed. This will lead
us to a set of assumptions (expressed as rely-conditions) about the behaviour of the
motor, sensors etc with which the gate is equipped. To clarify the earlier point about the
customer’s responsibility and authority, we mention some systems of wider scope that
could be tackled. If the requirement were to deliver a certain flow of water, we would
have to make assumptions about the available water flow. A yet wider system might be
concerned with the growth of crops, leading to assumptions about the weather, plant
physiology and the effects of irrigation. A requirement to maximise farm profits would
lead to assumptions about a wide range of factors including prices and (in Europe) the
4 There are strong reasons for thinking even more widely. The “Dependability IRC” project (see
www.dirc.org.uk) considers computer-based systems whose dependability depends critically
on the human (as well as the mechanical) components.
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Common Agricultural Policy. The example to be addressed here is a system with a
far more restricted requirement. Our customer’s responsibilities and authority are both
bounded by the sluice gate itself and its stipulated operation. The effects of the irrigation
schedule on the crops and and the farm profits are firmly outside our scope.
The requirement for our simple problem is that the sluice gate should be open for
at least min open in every hour and closed for at least min closed; open and closed
are phenomena of the physical gate. To formalise the requirement we introduce a vari-
able denoting the position of the gate. The requirement is concerned only with whether
the sluice gate is open or closed; however, we recognise that inevitably the gate will
sometimes be in neither position:
Height =̂ open | closed | neither
pos : Height
We are interested in the trace of pos values over time. Hence, in predicates, it will be
treated as a function of time and it may be indexed by a time. An alternative repre-
sentation for pos is as a real value giving the height of the sluice gate (for example, in
metres). We reject this alternative because at this stage it complicates the development
unnecessarily: the customer is interested only in whether the gate is open or closed, not
in the different intermediate points in its vertical travel.5
The overall requirement can now be formalised, using two constants:
min open =̂ 8min
min closed =̂ 48min
the requirement will be that in every hour the sluice gate be fully open for at least
min open, and fully closed for at least min closed. The remaining time in each hour
allows for the travel times between the open and closed positions.
In the definition of SluiceGateRequirement below, the notation interval T stands
for the set of all contiguous finite intervals that are subsets of the time interval T . The
operator ‘#’ gives the size of an interval. The integral of a predicate over an interval I,
such as
∫
I(pos = open), treats the predicate, pos = open, as a function of time because
pos is a function of time; it treats a true value as 1 and a false value as 0, as in the
Duration Calculus [3]. In short, the two integrals in the formalisation give the total time
in the interval I for which the variable pos is equal to open and closed respectively.
SluiceGateRequirement =̂
∀ I : interval T •
#I ≥ 1hr ⇒∫
I(pos = open) ≥ min open ∧
∫
I(pos = closed) ≥ min closed
5 It may also be argued that the alternative representation as a real value is pointless because
(as we shall see) the gate sensors allow the control system to detect directly only the presence
of the gate at the top or bottom of its travel. Although the conclusion may be correct, the
argument is misconceived. In many systems the state of the problem world must be inferred
from what can be sensed directly. The control system for the sluice gate, for example, might
infer the gate’s vertical position from assumptions about its rate of travel when the motor is
on. Such assumptions would then appear in rely conditions in the development.
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It might be that the customer prefers a looser constraint over each single hour and
a constraint closer to “one sixth” over some longer period such as a week: this would
allow the pattern of opening to be varied. Similarly, a further requirement might be
added specifying that the gate should not be opened or closed more often than three
times an hour. Since these possibilities add length to the specification without affecting
the basic principles, we do not pursue them here.
The specification of the whole system is to achieve satisfaction of this requirement:
SluiceGateSystem =̂
system
output pos : Height
guarantee SluiceGateRequirement
A system6 specification explicitly lists the observed inputs and outputs of the system,
any assumptions about its environment on which it relies, and the condition it guar-
antees to establish. In this case there are no assumptions and there are no inputs: the
overall specification is concerned only with the gate position, which is an output.
3 Introducing the controller
There is, of course, a question –even within the agreed boundaries– of which system is
being designed here. In some applications the designer might have the luxury of start-
ing from scratch and choosing the equipment, including the placing of sensors etc. Here
we assume that all the equipment is already in place in the problem world, and must
be treated as given. Figure 1 shows the machine (the computer executing the control
program that we are developing), the problem world (the gate with its sensors and drive
motor), and the requirement. The observable phenomena of the requirement are rep-
resented by the arrow marked a, and the interface of shared phenomena by which the
Control machine monitors and controls the Gate-Sensor-Motor (GSM) problem world
is represented by the line marked b.
Fig. 1. The Machine, the Problem World and the Requirement
The requirement (which in the preceding section was called SluiceGateRequirement)
is concerned only with pos
a : {pos : Height}
6 We will regard the subject of each specification of this kind as a system. Later we will write
such a specification for the control machine, another for the sluice gate mechanism, and so on.
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which is determined by the behaviour of GSM. At interface b, GSM also sets the sensors
top and bot, but the Control machine can set the direction control dir = up or dir =
down, and switch the motor by setting motor = on or motor = off :
b : Control ! {dir : up | down,motor : on | off}
GSM ! {top, bot : boolean}
We might have decomposed GSM into separate gate, sensor and motor components.
We have not done so here because it is simpler, and adequate for our purposes, to de-
scribe the GSM subsystem as a whole.
3.1 Specifying the Controller
The immediate objective is to arrive at a specification of the control system. It would
obviously be possible to observe that Control || GSM must satisfy the specification of
the Sluice Gate System and jump straight to an outline algorithm which indicated that
the control system should open the sluice gate; pause 8 minutes; then move the gate
down; pause for about 48 minutes; etc. Any temptation to specify the control system in
this way should be resisted. The aim here is to derive an implicit specification of the
control system from an understanding of the components. This identifies the assump-
tions clearly but the full payoff of this approach is apparent when faults are considered
in Section 4.
The Control machine’s inputs are the states of the sensors; its outputs are the motor
controls. It relies on the sensors and the motor working correctly, and must guarantee
that the required behaviour of the sluice gate is achieved, while not invalidating any
assumptions about how the GSM subsystem must be operated.
The states of the two sensors, top and bot, can be formalised as boolean functions
of time
top, bot : boolean
When functioning properly, they detect when the gate is fully open (top) or fully closed
(bot). We formalise this notion in the following definition. A timed predicate of the
form P over I states that the predicate P holds for every instant of time in the interval
I. In the definition, T is the complete time interval over which the system operates.
SensorProp =̂ (((pos = open)⇔ top) ∧ ((pos = closed)⇔ bot)) over T
This is equivalent to
∀ t : T • ((pos(t) = open)⇔ top(t)) ∧ ((pos(t) = closed)⇔ bot(t)).
The sluice gate is driven by a motor that turns a screw thread that raises or lowers
the gate. At the interface b the Control machine can switch the motor on or off, and
can set the direction in which it drives the gate. If the motor has been on in the direc-
tion up for at least some constant uptime, the gate will have reached the open position
and will remain there after the motor is turned off. A similar condition applies for the
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downward travel. First, we formalise the motor control and direction states, and define
the constants uptime and downtime
motor : on | off
direction : up | down
uptime =̂ 1min
downtime =̂ 1min
Next, we formalise the definition of the motor’s effect on the gate. In the definition, an
interval I adjoins an interval J, written I adjoins J, if the supremum of I is equal to the
infimum of J, i.e., sup I = inf J:
MotorOperation =̂
∀ I, J : interval T • I adjoins J ⇒#I ≥ uptime ∧((motor = on ∧ dir = up) over I) ∧
((motor = off ) over J)
⇒ ((pos = open) over J) ∧#I ≥ downtime ∧((motor = on ∧ dir = down) over I) ∧
((motor = off ) over J)
⇒ ((pos = closed) over J)
The task of the controller is to achieve the SluiceGateRequirement on the assump-
tion that it can rely on the properties of the sensor and the motor. Although pos is not a
direct input or output of the controller (see Figure 1 and the accompanying descriptions
of a and b), we allow the controller specification below to reference pos as an ‘external’
variable. This allows the specification to incorporate the original requirement directly.7
Controller0 =̂
system
external pos : Height
input top, bot : boolean
output motor : on | off
output direction : up | down
rely SensorProp ∧ MotorOperation
guarantee SluiceGateRequirement
3.2 The Breakage Concern
At first sight it seems that our specification, though unrefined, is complete so far as it
goes. But it is not: we must first address several standard concerns. Here we will address
only the breakage concern of [5]. In a control problem such as we are discussing here, it
is necessary to ensure that the machine itself does not cause failure of any component of
7 Because pos is not in the interface b of phenomena shared by the Control machine and the GSM
problem world, a program implementing the controller may not refer to it. Any reference to
pos must be eliminated from the program text by a form of refinement in the problem domain.
We discuss the removal of such external references in Section 3.3.
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the problem domain by ignoring known restrictions on its use. For example, checking
the motor equipment manual we learn that the motor will be damaged if it is switched
between directions without being brought to rest in between. Between any two periods
in which the motor is on and running in opposite directions there must therefore be a
period in which it is switched off; and this period must not be less than the motor’s shut
down time, motor shutdown.
A second restriction applies when the motor has driven the gate to the open or shut
position. It must then be switched off soon enough to avoid straining the motor and
mechanism when the gate reaches the end of its vertical travel and further movement is
impossible. motor limit is the time within which the motor must be switched off once
the gate has reached the open or closed position.
We formalise both restrictions in the definition MotorRestrictions. In this definition,
an interval I precedes an interval J, written I precedes J, if the supremum of I is less
than or equal to the infimum of J.
MotorRestrictions =̂
∀ I, J : interval T • I precedes J ∧ (motor = on) over I ∧ (motor = on) over J ∧(∃ dir : up | down •
(direction = dir) over I ∧ (direction 6= dir) over J
) ⇒(∃K : Interval • #K ≥ motor shutdown ∧
I precedes K precedes J ∧ (motor = off ) over K
)
∧
∀ I : interval T •(
motor = on ∧
(
(pos = open ∧ direction = up) ∨
(pos = closed ∧ direction = down)
))
over I ⇒
#I ≤ motor limit
Only if it respects the MotorRestrictions can the Control machine rely on the be-
haviour described in MotorOperation. Thus, the specification for the controller (still
assuming fault-free sensors) is now
Controller1 =̂
system
external pos : Height
input top, bot : boolean
output motor : on | off
output direction : up | down
rely SensorProp ∧ MotorOperation
guarantee SluiceGateRequirement ∧ MotorRestrictions
3.3 Removing the External Reference
References to the external variable pos must be eliminated from the controller specifica-
tion before deriving an implementation. For our simple example this is straightforward
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because the assumption SensorProp gives a way to rewrite the references to pos in terms
of top and bot. For example, the revised sluice gate requirement becomes
SluiceGateRequirement2 =̂
∀ I : interval T • #I ≥ 1hr ⇒ ∫I top ≥ min open ∧ ∫I bot ≥ min closed
MotorRestrictions and MotorOperation can be revised in the same manner to give
MotorRestrictions2 and MotorOperation2 respectively. Because the controller speci-
fication can rely on SensorProp, rewriting it to use the revised predicates gives a speci-
fication that is formally equivalent8.
The assumption SensorProp has now fulfilled its purpose, and can be removed to
give a refined specification. Further, because pos is no longer referenced in the specifi-
cation, its declaration can be removed. This gives the following refined specification.
Controller2 =̂
system
input top, bot : boolean
output motor : on | off
output direction : up | down
rely MotorOperation2
guarantee SluiceGateRequirement2 ∧ MotorRestrictions2
4 Detecting Domain Faults
The specification Controller2 is idealised in the sense that all of the components in the
problem world are assumed to function faultlessly. In a critical system –or any system
in which it is important to limit the possible damage to the equipment– this assumption
must be questioned. Potential faults must be identified and the software must deal with
them appropriately. In [5] this obligation is called the reliability concern. If a faulty
component is detected, the Control machine must switch off the motor and turn on an
alarm to indicate that the system needs attention from the maintenance engineer and
that the irrigation requirement is no longer being satisfied.
4.1 Domain faults
In the present section we are concerned only with the analysis of domain faults and
with formalising their detection. We address the composition of this requirement with
the SluiceGateRequirement in the next section. We start in the problem domain, and
identify observable faults that can arise in the domain. Our analysis uncovers potential
faults like these (but not only these):
– A log becomes jammed under the gate.
8 The equivalence is, of course, only formal: eliminating SensorProp from the formulae can not
eliminate our reliance on it in the physical problem world. We address this concern in the next
section.
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– A sensor develops an open circuit fault (fails false).
– A sensor develops a short circuit fault (fails true).
– The screw mechanism becomes rusty and the gate jams.
– The screw mechanism breaks, allowing the gate to slide freely.
– The direction control cable is cut.
– The motor efficiency is reduced by deterioration of the bearings.
– The motor overheats.
We then consider how these faults in the problem domain can be detected by the
Control machine at its interface b with the domain (see Figure 1). Because this interface
is very simple, and consists only of the states of the top and bot sensors and the motor
settings, it is clear that the Control machine can not distinguish between different faults
in the domain. For example, it can not distinguish between a log jammed under the gate
and an open-circuit bot sensor: both manifest themselves by failure of the bot sensor
to indicate arrival of the gate at the closed position in spite of the motor having been
set on and down for at least downtime. In a safety-critical system we would consider
improving the interface by adding new sensors. For example, we might add a sensor to
detect motor temperature or motor speed; or we might provide a finer grain of sensing of
the vertical position of the gate. For the purposes of this example, we add an additional
Boolean sensor, motor too hot, that indicates the motor temperature is excessive. An
interesting aspect of this fault is that the phenomena used to describe the fault are not
part of the description of the ideal behaviour of the sluice gate.
The faulty state, Faulty GSM, can be detected by the occurrence of any of these
(informally expressed) conditions:
– The top sensor does not become true when it should.
– The bot sensor does not become true when it should.
– The bot sensor does not become false when it should (when the motor has been set
on and up for a duration of at least rise start time).
– The top sensor does not become false when it should (when the motor has been set
on and down for a duration of at least fall start time).
– The top sensor becomes true earlier than it should (when the motor has been set on
and up).
– The bot sensor becomes true earlier than it should (when the motor has been set on
and down).
– The top sensor changes value while the motor is set off.
– The bot sensor changes value while the motor is set off.
– top and bot are simultaneously true at any time.
– The motor too hot sensor becomes true.
For brevity we will not present the full formalisation of Faulty GSM. Given suitable
declarations of duration constants for the criteria of fault-free operation in the domain
we obtain a definition of the faulty state. Recognition of the state is triggered by an
interval J in which a fault condition is detected.
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Faulty GSM =̂ λ J : interval Time •
∃ I : interval T • I adjoins J ∧(
(motor = on) over I ∧ (direction = up) over (I ∪ J) ∧
#I ≥ healthy rise time ∧ (¬ top) over J
)
∨(
(motor = on) over I ∧ (direction = down) over (I ∪ J) ∧
#I > healthy fall time ∧ (¬ bot) over J
)
∨(
(motor = on) over I ∧ (direction = up) over (I ∪ J) ∧
#I > rise start time ∧ bot over J
)
∨
.
.
.
((top ∧ bot) over J) ∨
((motor too hot) over J)
We must now discharge the obligation to show that Faulty GSM holds whenever a fault
is present in the domain for which we require the Control machine to switch off the
motor and turn on the alarm. We leave this as an exercise for the energetic reader who
has completed the definition of Faulty GSM.
4.2 Composing the Requirements
Our intention is to compose both requirements (irrigation and fault tolerance) in the
one Control machine. We must therefore elaborate the interface b of Figure 1 to include
the setting of the alarm and the temperature sensor. Modifying the annotation given in
Section 3 we have:
b : Control ! {dir : up | down,motor : on | off , alarm : on | off}
GSM ! {top, bot : boolean,motor too hot : boolean}
First we must elaborate our existing Control machine, specifying that during its
execution the alarm is off. The elaborated machine is Controller3:
AlarmOff =̂
system
output alarm : on | off
guarantee(alarm = off ) over T
Controller3 =̂ Controller2 ∧ AlarmOff .
Two systems may be conjoined: the inputs and outputs of the conjoined system are
the unions of the inputs and outputs respectively of the two systems (common inputs
and outputs must have the same type), and the rely and guarantee conditions are the
conjunctions of their rely and guarantee conditions respectively. So the specification
Controller2 ∧ AlarmOff
specifies a system that is the same as Controller2 but has an additional output alarm
that is always off.
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The behaviour required when a domain fault has been detected is to switch the
motor off and the alarm on within some permitted response time fault response:
AlarmSet =̂
∃ J,K : interval T • J adjoins K ∧
J ∪ K = T ∧ #J ≤ fault response ∧
(alarm = on ∧ motor = off ) over K
The required behaviour for raising the alarm can be simply defined. Note that it requires
the restrictions on controlling the motor to be maintained.
Raise Alarm =̂
system
input top, bot : boolean
input motor too hot : boolean
output motor : on | off
output direction : up | down
output alarm : on | off
guarantee MotorRestrictions2 ∧ AlarmSet
Finally, we must specify the combination of Controller3 and Raise Alarm in re-
sponse to faults. For this we need to consider two modes of fault detection:
– faults that persist over a long enough interval of time that we insist they are de-
tected; and
– faults that exist for only a short period of time that may or may not be detected.
We introduce two separate (but similar) operators to allow these two different modes
of fault detection to be specified. For systems S1 and S2 and a predicate C that takes a
time interval as a parameter (like Faulty GSM)
– a hard fault obliges the system to take notice
S1 until C requires S2
and
– a “transient” fault allows the system to take notice
S1 until C allows S2
For example,
Controller4 =̂ Controller3 until Faulty GSM allows Raise Alarm
describes a system that operates as an ideal controller, but may raise the alarm if there
is a fault, and
Controller5 =̂ Controller4 until Hard Fault GSM requires Raise Alarm
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describes a system that must raise the alarm as soon as a hard fault appears, where
Hard Fault GSM =̂
(λ J : interval Time • Faulty GSM(J) ∧ #J ≥ reaction time)
We describe the semantics of these two combinators, starting with the more liberal
second combinator because it is slightly simpler. S1 until C allows S2 either behaves
like S1, or if there exists an interval J over which C(J) holds, it may (is allowed to)
behave like S1 until the start of the interval J, and then behave like S2 from that time
on. To describe the combinator more formally, we use the term behaviour to refer to a
trace of the values of the variables over time, and the function behaviours(S,T) gives
the set of all possible behaviours of system S over the time interval T . The boolean term
C(J)(b) states that the predicate C(J) holds for the behaviour b.
b ∈ behaviours(S1 until C allows S2,T) ≡
b ∈ behaviours(S1,T) ∨
(∃ I, J,K : interval T • I adjoins J adjoins K ∧ T = I ∪ J ∪ K ∧ C(J)(b) ∧
(∃ b1 : behaviours(S1,T); b2 : behaviours(S2, J ∪ K) •
b = (I C b1)a b2))
The operator “I C b1” takes a timed trace behaviour b1 and restricts it to a trace whose
domain is contained in the interval I. The catenation of two traces, b a c assumes that
the domain of b has an end time equal to the start time of the domain of c and that the
values of the variables at the end of trace b are equal to the values of the variables at the
beginning of trace c; the resultant trace is then the union of the two traces.
The semantics of the obligatory exception mechanism is similar but it requires that
there is no earlier occurrence of the condition C. The first alternative allows for the case
where there is no interval over which C holds.
b ∈ behaviours(S1 until C requires S2,T) ≡
b ∈ behaviours(S1,T) ∧ ¬ (∃L : interval T • C(L)(b)) ∨
(∃ I, J,K : interval T • I adjoins J adjoins K ∧ T = I ∪ J ∪ K ∧ C(J)(b) ∧
(¬ ∃L : interval T • inf L < inf J ∧ C(L)(b))) ∧
(∃ b1 : behaviours(S1,T); b2 : behaviours(S2, J ∪ K) •
b = (I C b1)a b2))
5 Further work
This paper illustrates what the authors hope will become a method for handling a class
of developments. However, much remains to be done to establish the scope of this
method and to refine its details. In this section we consider some avenues for further
work.
5.1 On the Sluice Gate application
The Sluice Gate problem has proved very stimulating and we have tried to expose the
issues it has thrown up rather than modify the problem to fit our evolving method. For
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example, the second author has on occasions played the role of our customer and has
consistently refused requests to acquire new sensors to simplify formulations.
There are, of course, a variety of other (dependability) issues which could be con-
sidered; examples include:
– the power supply to the motor;
– the hardware signals levels used for motor and dir;
– the maximum load of the motor;
– the maximum start up time under any load less than the maximum;
– the running state revolutions per minute.
While we believe that such points do not bring in fundamentally different technical
requirements, they should be categorised as an indication that nothing has been hidden.
5.2 More general points
The aim to separate the treatment of errors from the behaviour required in an (unre-
alistically) ideal environment has caused us considerable difficulty. We have experi-
mented with an asymmetric otherwise operator, ways of combining traces of descrip-
tions which permit non-determinism, and only late on accepted the allows/requires
distinction. The need to say that the presence of one condition overrides others ap-
pears to force an asymmetric operator and the (Deontic) distinction is at least plausible.
Whether there is a smaller set of primitive concepts in terms of which these ideas can
be expressed is the subject of further work.
Many open (real-time) systems appear to operate cyclicly. Indeed, even the sluice
gate could be viewed as operating on an hourly cycle (possibly embedded in a larger
cycle between, say, maintenance periods). The authors are not aware of any (temporal)
notations that offer clear ways of indicating such cyclic behaviour.
It would be useful to have more systematic ways of looking for fault situations. If
one followed [5] and constructed a model of the gate within the Control system, this
would –for example– offer a notion within the Controller of the expected height of the
gate. This, in turn, would facilitate expression of a rely condition to show the degree of
expected drift/conformance. We have only made tentative experiments with this idea so
far.
One of the refrees raised the interesting point of the “evolvability” of a system.
The authors agree that this is an important issue; evolution is in fact a major strand of
work within the Dependability IRC. A study of the contribution of other research on
“evolvability” to the issues of this paper will be undertaken in the future.
6 Conclusions
The starting point for the specification of a control system is a specification of the
desired behaviour of the controlled system, e.g., the sluice gate position, given inde-
pendently of the (physical) mechanisms used to implement the (physical) control. As
indicated earlier, there are different possible models of the system that allow different
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aspects of the system to be specified. Choice of an appropriate model comes down to
the customer’s choice of requirements. The model must be rich enough to allow the
requirements to be specified, but not so rich that the specification is unnecessarily com-
plex.
Having specified the overall requirements, we must detail the properties of the given
(physical) components (e.g., the sensors and motor). These are the properties the con-
troller can rely on to achieve the desired goal. In addition, the components may have
restrictions on the way in which they may be operated without risk of breakage. The
controller must ensure that it conforms to these requirements too.
In specifying the requirements and the properties of the components it is in general
necessary to make use of models of parts of the system that are not directly interfaced to
the machine (for example, the external variable pos in the controller specification does
not appear in the interface between the machine and the problem world). This necessity
springs from two sources. First, the customer’s interest is not, in general, restricted to
phenomena at the interface: the Sluice Gate customer cares whether the gate is open
or closed, not about the sensor states. Second, if we fail to distinguish phenomena at
the interface from those that lie deeper in the problem world, we can not address the
reliability concern: it arises precisely from that distinction. It is then a central goal of the
process of refining the controller specification to rephrase its required behaviour solely
in terms of its interface to the problem world.
A further technique we used to structure the controller specification is to separate
the Control requirement when the problem domain is behaving faultlessly from the
requirement in the presence of faults. It is first worthwhile to examine possible faults
in the overall system. These may involve phenoma that are not part of the description
of the idealised machine. Next one must consider the class of faults that can be phrased
purely in terms of the system’s interface to the environment. The utility of the machine’s
response to problem world failures is limited by the richness of the interface between
them. A richer interface allows better diagnosis of faults and more specific responses.
However, introducing richer interfaces has two consequences: first, they may be more
prone to failure than the simple interface; and second, they make the control software
itself more complicated and hence more prone to software error.
Our building blocks for specifications are systems specified in terms of their inputs,
outputs and external variables as well as the assumptions about the inputs that they
rely upon and the goals that they guarantee to achieve. To build more complex speci-
fications one could continue to use systems specified in the same way, but with more
complex rely and guarantee conditions. Alternatively, as we have done here, one can
provide operators such as conjunction and until-requires to combine system specifi-
cations. Logically both approaches are equivalent; the choice between them is more
one of ease of presentation and understandability of the resulting specification. A struc-
tured specification built from component systems can be flattened to a simple system
specification with rely and guarantee conditions.
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